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Abstract 
 
This article analyses the contribution of foreign direct investment to structural 
change  in  various  groups  of  economies  in  transition:  new  European  Union 
member  countries  (including  Bulgaria  and  Romania),  South-East  Europe 
(excluding  Bulgaria  and  Romania),  and  the  Commonwealth  of  Independent 
States. It comes to the conclusion that foreign direct investment has had the 
deepest impact on structural change in new EU members, and the smallest (in 
fact negative) impact in the Russian Federation. This is related to differences in 
timing  of  investment  flows  (they  started  earlier  in  new  EU  members;  other 
subregions caught up later on), as well as the sectoral composition of FDI. It 
also has to be noted that the FDI of new EU member countries, especially in 
automotive production and electronics proved to be more vulnerable to the crisis 
of 2008–2009 than FDI in other transition economies. It remains to be seen if 
these countries in turn will be able to benefit fast from the post-crisis recovery. 
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1. Introduction 
Modernizing  the  economy  through  structural  change  has  been  a  key 
prerequisite for Central and Eastern Europe‟s successful reintegration into the 
world economy after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 (Landesmann, 2000, 
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2003). To what degree foreign direct investment (FDI) can contribute to that 
restructuring has been a contested issue (UNCTAD, 2003). Immediately after 
transition had started – and independence had been gained, in many cases  – 
liberalization in trade and capital flows became the first vehicles of reintegration 
with the world economy (EBRD, 1999). In most economies in transition, trade 
liberalization not only tended to be radical, but it was also accompanied by the 
elimination of the state monopoly on international trade. A major reorientation 
of trade, both in terms of partners and products, followed. 
From the mid-1990s onwards, inward FDI has gained importance in the 
restructuring of an increasing number of Central and Eastern European countries 
(UNCTAD, 2003). Beyond its contribution to financial resources, investment, 
technology  and  providing  access  to  markets,  inward  FDI  in  economies  in 
transition has also played a role in the strengthening of the private sector and the 
emergence  of  market-economy  behaviour,  as  well  as  the  elimination  of 
macroeconomic  distortions  inherited  from  earlier  centrally  planned  systems 
(Kalotay,  2001).  Industrial  restructuring  accelerated  when  privatization 
involving  FDI  was  stepped  up  (Hunya,  2000).  However,  the  process  of 
restructuring  started  to  take  place  unevenly  (Hunya,  2001).  A  duality  of 
performance in the manufacturing sector appeared in two respects: a dichotomy 
between modern, foreign-dominated industries on the one hand, and traditional 
industries with both domestic and foreign companies, on the other; and a duality 
of high and low FDI-penetration countries.  
Almost two decades after the start of transition, and with the accession of 
10 economies in transition to the European Union (EU), it is timely to take stock 
of what has happened to FDI flows to economies in transition in the longer run, 
and  how  it  has  contributed  to  structural  change  which  was  needed  to 
successfully reintegrate into the world economy. For that purpose, this paper 
analyses the main patterns of FDI inflows to economies in transition over the 
period  1991–2006.  This  study  does  not  cover  in  its  discussion  of  structural 
changes in FDI the period of the crisis which originated in the United States in 
2007, and became a global crisis in 2008. It nevertheless presents a case study of 
the automotive industry, which was forced to undergo major downsizing and 
restructuring in 2008–2009, before rebounding in 2010. The study also analyses 
FDI flows in their entirety since 1992 (the year since comprehensive data are 
available till 2009). 
By economies in transition,
1 this study means both the new EU member 
countries  which  have  been  reclassif ied as  part  of the  group  of  developed 
countries  and  the  EU,  and  the  countries  of  South -East  Europe  and  the 
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Commonwealth  of  Independent  States  (CIS).
2  This  paper  takes  into 
consideration the divergences that exist between various economies in transition 
in  terms of the quantity and structure of FDI. For that analytical purpose, 
countries in transition are grouped into four categories: 
1.  New EU members (that joined it in 2004
3 and 2007); 
2.  South-East Europe (except Bulgaria and Romania which became EU 
members in 2007); 
3.  the Russian Federation (a category of its own) and 
4.  the other members of the CIS. 
Some of the structural analysis is further cut into three periods: 
1.  1991–1995, or early transition, when most of the initial adjustment 
took place, with privatizations that often limited the participation of 
foreign investors;
4 
2.  1996–2000, or the period of major advances in terms international 
integration, and an opening to foreign participation in the future EU 
member countries and 
3.  2001–2006/2007, or the period when EU enlargements were prepared 
and realized, and both privatization-related and greenfield FDI was 
moving increasingly into new locations.  
FDI has been so important for the reintegration of economies in transition 
into the world economy because, unlike trade, FDI is not a one-off transaction. 
Productive capacities created through FDI remain in the host country for the 
long  term.  Moreover,  transnational  corporations  (TNCs),  the  main  agents  of 
FDI, participate in almost two-thirds of world trade: one third through their sales 
to third parties, and one third through their intra-group transactions ($4.7 trillion 
in 2006, out of a total world trade of $14.1 trillion) (UNCTAD, 2007). 
The discussion of this paper starts with an overview of total inward FDI 
from a quantitative point of view. The second section looks at the role of such 
FDI in financial accumulation (FDI to gross fixed capital formation). The third 
section analyses the patterns of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) 
from three perspectives: 1. their link with FDI through privatization; 2. their 
industry patterns; and 3. their geographical patterns. The fourth section looks 
briefly at the case of the automotive industry. Finally, section five concludes the 
discussion from a policy perspective. All data used in this paper are derived 
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from UNCTAD‟s FDI/TNC and cross-border M&A databases, unless otherwise 
stated. 
 
2. Growth and the spread of FDI inflows, 1992–2008, decline in 2009 
Over the period 1992–2008 the FDI inflows of economies in transition 
had maintained a strong upward trend, with the exceptions of 1994 and 1996. 
Their growth followed a chronological sequence, spreading from the West (the 
future EU member countries) towards the South-East (South-East Europe) and 
the East (the CIS). In this process, the rise of the Russian Federation to a status 
of major global recipient (to FDI inflows of $75 billion in 2008 alone) has been 
probably the most spectacular phenomenon. Nevertheless, new EU members still 
accounted for almost half (49% of the group‟s cumulative total of close to $ 1 
trillion  over  the  period  1992–2009  (figure  1).  They  were  followed  by  the 
Russian Federation (27%), other CIS (17%), and South-East Europe (only 7%). 
One of the reasons why the cumulative FDI inflows of South-East Europe were 
small is due to the fact that Bulgaria and Romania are now listed under the new 
EU members. 
 
Figure 1. FDI inflows to economies in transition, by group, 1992–2009 
(Millions of dollars) 
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Source: UNCTAD, FDI/TNC database 
Note: Data exclude FDI in special purpose vehicles (SPVs). 
 
Thanks to the quick growth of FDI inflows, the share of economies in 
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exception of some years in the late 1990s. Over the period 1992–2008, as the 
FDI inflows of economies in transition grew faster than the inflows of other 
countries of the world, their share in the world total quadrupled, from 4% in 
1992 to 16% in 2008 (figure 2). In 2009, they declined back to 14%. As for 
individual sub-groups, the share of new EU members has been on a decline since 
2005, although from a high level, while the share of the Russian Federation 
increased sharply between 2006 and 2008 (figure 2). The relative decline of new 
EU  members  may  be  related  to  the  two-way  restructurings  of  productive 
capacities  that  lave  led  not  just  to  new  investments  but  also  rationalizations 
(Hunya  and  Sass,  2005),  while  the  rise  of  the  Russian  Federation  is  mostly 
linked to its GDP growth (for market-seeking investors) and the high prices of 
its natural resources (for resource-seeking FDI) (UNCTAD, 2007). 
 
Figure 2. Share of economies in transition in global FDI inflows, 1992–2009 
(Per cent) 
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The spreading of FDI flows was related to differences in the phasing of 
transition in general, and FDI attraction in particular, in different economies in 
transition  (Holland  et  al,  2000).  The  first  surge  of  inflows  in  the  1990s  for 
example was linked with the privatization efforts of the would-be EU member 
countries (with the exception of Bulgaria and Romania), while the second surge 
in inflows after 2000 was more related to the opening up of South-East Europe, 
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attractiveness  of  natural-resource-rich  economies  in  the  CIS  (Kalotay  and 
Hunya, 2000). 
Despite the overall rise and spreading of FDI inflows in economies in 
transition, there remain issues related to the lumpiness and fluctuations of those 
flows. One of them is the lessons of the end of privatization after 1995 in various 
new EU member countries and a subsequent slowdown of FDI inflows: it is 
expected to be repeated in other countries undergoing similar large privatization 
processes in the current stage. 
A second issue is the post-EU accession slump of FDI: it can affect other 
countries that will join the integration grouping in the future. Indeed, a new take 
off of FDI started in the accession countries after 2000 when the timetable for 
their membership was clarified. However, as mentioned above, it was followed 
by  a  second  slowdown  after  2004,  as  restructuring  from  manufacturing  to 
services FDI took its toll (Kalotay, 2006). For countries that aspire to accede to 
the EU at a later stage, it is vital to know how strong the relationship between 
EU accession and fluctuations in inward FDI is. In the case of CIS countries for 
which future EU membership is not an option, it is important to know in general 
what can drive FDI in the post-privatization stage (beside natural resources). 
The third issue is related to the somewhat unexpected rise of FDI to the Russian 
Federation  and  other  CIS  after  the  oil  price  hikes.  If  this  rise  is  not  fully 
warranted by improvements in the business environment, can we say that the 
whole rise is due to oil and other natural resource prices? Again, related to the 
rise of FDI to the Russian Federation and other CIS countries, is the question of 
increasing State ownership in certain industries. If the re-emergence of the State 
no longer hinders inward FDI, can we say that privatization is no longer needed 
to attract FDI? 
A fourth issue is related to the crisis of 2008–2009. The crisis has affected 
FDI around the globe, but certain economies (e.g. Brazil and China) proved to 
be more resistant to the decline. In such economies, in fact, the decline was 
delayed to 2009, and on the hypothesis that 2010 is the first year of a modest 
recovery, the crisis may prove to be a one-year phenomenon only. This relative 
resistance  was  also  characterizing  the  Russian  Federation  and  other  CIS 
countries. In turn, the crisis started earlier in the new EU  member countries 
which were deeply integrated with Western Europe, a region feeling the effects 
of the crisis early on, and in South-East Europe. 
The  largest  open  issue  is  related  to  the  unevenness  of  FDI  and  the 
marginalization  of  various  countries  in  transition.  There  are  indeed  large 
differences in cumulative inflows (figure 3). Massive flows have been attracted 
in large economies, such as the Russian Federation and Poland ($263 billion and 
$147 billion in 1992–2009, respectively), and to some „early bird‟ economies 
which have relied on FDI from an early stage of transformation (Kalotay, 2001) 
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over  18  years  characterize  some  small  low-income  economies  such  as 
Kyrgyzstan,  Tajikistan,  the  Republic  of  Moldova  and  the  Former  Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia (figure 3). 
 
Figure 3. The five largest and smallest cumulative FDI inflows in economies 
in transition, 1992–2009    (Billion dollars)  
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Source: UNCTAD, FDI/TNC database 
 
3. FDI in financial accumulation 
FDI has various development impacts on home countries. In economies in 
transition, given the resources intensity of transformation and structural change, 
its  contribution  to  financial  accumulation  has  been  particularly  important 
(Holland et al., 2000). This role of FDI in financial accumulation can be proxied 
by its ratio to gross fixed capital formation (GFCF).  
In  the  economies  in  transition,  that  ratio  of  FDI  to  GFCF  has  indeed 
tended to be higher than the world average, and has increased over time (figure 
4). It has to be stressed here that due to fluctuations in data, three-year moving 
averages have been used in this measurement. On the world average, the ratio 
increased over the 1990s and reached a peak of 16% in 2000. Afterwards, it fell 
under 10% in 2002-2004 but exceeded 10% in 2005 and 2006. In economies in 
transition, the decline of the early 2000s was much less pronounced, and in some 
parts of the grouping, such as South-East Europe, it was not felt at all (figure 4). 62   K￡lm￡n KALOTAY 
 
Figure 4. FDI inflows to economies in transition, compared to GFCF, three-
year averages, 1992–2008  (Per cent) 
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Source: UNCTAD, FDI/TNC database 
 
One has to note also however that some countries have relied heavily on 
FDI in their capital accumulation, others have not (figure 5). Both groups are 
heterogeneous: the first one includes two „early birds‟ in FDI attraction (Estonia 
and  Hungary),  a  „late  star‟  in  FDI  attraction  (Bulgaria)  an  oil  economy 
(Kazakhstan), and a low-income country with very low GFCF (Tajikistan). The 
second  group  logically  includes  two  large  economies  where  even  apparently 
large volumes of FDI flows are small compared to the size of the economy (the 
Russian  Federation,  which  is  the  number  one  recipient  of  FDI  inflows  in 
absolute values, and Ukraine), the most developed (highest income) economy 
(Slovenia), and two countries with political problems in FDI attraction (Belarus 
and  Uzbekistan)  (figure  5).  It  has  to  be  noted  that  this  calculation  excludes 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia, due to missing data for a large 
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Figure  5.  The  five  highest  and  lowest  ratios  of  inward  FDI  to  GFCF, 
average of 1992–2009 (Percent) 
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Source: UNCTAD, FDI/TNC database 
Note: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia are excluded form the calculation due to a 
large number of missing data points. 
 
One  can  conclude  on  GFCF  that  in  general,  FDI  inflows  have  been 
important resources for transition but varied by country. The share was high in 
countries  that  based  their  development  on  FDI;  in  smaller  countries  well 
endowed  with  natural  resources;  and  in  low-income  countries  with  very  low 
GFCF.  The  share  was  low  in  countries  that  avoided  inward  FDI  in  their 
development strategy; some larger countries; the most developed country that 
could rely on domestic resources; and countries that had political problems. One 
has to ask therefore: if the speed of FDI penetration correlated with the speed of 
transition, which one was the cause and which one was the consequence? Can 
we say that, ceteris paribus, an economy in transition relies more on FDI than a 
non-transition economy? 
 
4. Cross-border M&As: industry and geographical patterns 
Of the various forms of international integration of national economies 
(trade, migration, financial flows, investment etc.), FDI is a particularly strong 
agent  of  structural  change  and  upgrading  (Ozawa,  1992;  UNCTAD,  1999, 
2002).  Under  the  conditions  of  transition  from  centrally  planned  to  market 
economy, when the domestic private sector is in a nascent stage, that role should 
be particularly strong (Kalotay, 2001).  
To test the hypothesis of FDI as agent of structural change in transition, 
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the industry and geographical trends of inward FDI. This is done so because they 
move together with FDI globally. In addition, in economies in transition, FDI 
and M&As have been traditionally linked together via privatization, although 
unevenly: privatization was always a main source of FDI in early transition but 
in early transition FDI did not necessarily play a key role in privatization. A 
third reason is that data are more detailed for M&As than for FDI. For example, 
this is the way to measure structural patterns in the Russian Federation that does 
not report these trends for FDI and other foreign investment separately.
5 
As a negative consequence of using M&As, one has to mention that their 
statistics by default miss out greenfield  investment, and that may be a problem 
for  industries  such  as  electronics  manufacturing  that  are  main  targets  of 
greenfield projects, and may be underestimated by M&A data. It also has to be 
stressed that FDI and cross -border M&A data are not directly compa rable as 
they are collected by different methodologies.
6 As a consequence the difference 
between total FDI and cross -border M&As does not give us the value of 
greenfield projects.   
Over the period of 1991–2006, one can observe different patterns in the 
sectoral and industry composition of cross-border M&As (figure 6): 
Figure 6. Sectoral composition of cross-border M&A sales in economies in  
transition, 1991–2006    (Per cent) 
New EU members
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Source: UNCTAD, Cross-border M&A database 
 
1.  Data  on  the  cross-border  M&A  sales  of  new  EU  members  confirm  the 
previous observation (Stare, 2005) that they are service economies: they derived 
76% of their revenues from services transactions in 1991–2006 (figure 6). If one 
cuts the data series into three periods (table 1): early 1990s (1991–1995), late 
1990s (1996–2000), and the new millennium (2001–2006), one can observe that 
telecommunications and banking were leading industries in all periods (except 
for banking in the early 1990s); the share of business services was constantly 
increasing, to almost 10% in the early 2000s; the share of electricity, gas and 
water was fluctuating, following the trends in privatizations (in the early 1990s 
and in the 2000s); and motor vehicles were important in the early 1990s but their 
share declined due to a shift towards greenfield projects. This is the picture of a 
group that undergoes important shifts toward higher value added activities. 
 
Table  1.  Share  of  selected  industries  in  total  M&A  sales  of  new  EU 
members, 1991–2006 
Industry  1991–1995  1996–2000  2001–2006 
Mining and petroleum  0.5%  3.9%  3.2% 
Food, beverages and tobacco  12.2%  6.6%  1.9% 
Motor vehicles  19.9%  1.8%  0.5% 
Electricity, gas and water  16.3%  3.8%  13.7% 
Transport and telecom  21.3%  32.3%  26.2% 
Finance  7.9%  28.0%  23.2% 
Business services  0.0%  2.0%  9.5% 
Source: UNCTAD, Cross-border M&A database     
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2.  South-East Europe is somewhat similar to the new EU (figure 6): services 
still dominated, but manufacturing was more important. As for historical shifts 
(table  2),  one  can  note  a  large  but  fluctuating  share  of  telecommunications, 
except  in  the  early  1990s  when  privatizations  did  not  yet  start;  the  relative 
importance  of  the  food  and  beverages  in  the  early  1990s  and  that  of  the 
chemicals industry in the early 2000s; and the rise of finance and banking in 
services since the mid 1990s. These are signs of some kind of modernization, 
although not as pronounced as in the new EU member countries. 
 
Table  2.  Share  of  selected  industries  in  total  M&A  sales  of  South-East 
Europe, 1991–2006 
Industry  1991–1995  1996–2000  2001–2006 
Mining and petroleum  0.0%  0.1%  5.6% 
Food, beverages and tobacco  23.5%  2.5%  6.0% 
Chemicals  18.3%  1.7%  23.0% 
Transport and telecom  0.4%  67.4%  24.3% 
Finance  1.1%  18.7%  32.9% 
Source: UNCTAD, Cross-border M&A database     
 
3.  A  different  world  is  that  of  cross-border  M&A  sales  in  the  Russian 
Federation, dominated by the primary sector (68% over the full period) (figure 
6). The  share  of  mining  and  petroleum  was  rising  spectacularly  in the  early 
2000s, reaching 73% (table 3). In turn, the share of telecom was declining from a 
high level. In other industries, one sees mostly fluctuations in other industries. 
Food beverages and tobacco, and financial services, maintained their relative 
importance over different periods (table 3). This picture is that of a country that 
undergoes  negative  structural  changes,  with  extractive  industries  gaining 
importance over time.  
 
Table  3.  Share  of  selected  industries  in  total  M&A  sales  of  the  Russian 
Federation, 1991–2006 
Industry  1991–1995  1996–2000  2001–2006 
Mining and petroleum  10.5%  7.5%  73.0% 
Food, beverages and tobacco  0.0%  12.8%  5.9% 
Coke and petroleum  0.0%  12.6%  0.8% 
Metals  11.9%  1.2%  0.8% 
Motor vehicles  0.0%  0.0%  0.3% 
Transport and telecom  64.9%  50.4%  7.6% 
Finance  7.3%  3.0%  5.4% 
Source: UNCTAD, Cross-border M&A database 
     
4.  In the group of other CIS countries, no sector dominated cross-border M&A 
sales in 1991–2006 (figure 6). Moreover, there are few clear-cut trends (mostly PATTERNS OF INWARD FDI IN ECONOMIES IN TRANSITION    67 
 
fluctuations) (table 4). Mining and petroleum were still very important in all 
periods (almost half of all transactions in 1996–2000 and almost one third in 
2001–2006). Transport and telecom became important in 1996–2000, and the 
share of metals and finance rose sharply in the early 2000s. This is a picture of 
some  limited  structural  change,  with  natural-resource-based  activities  still 
playing a major role. 
 
Table 4. Share of selected industries in total M&A sales of other CIS, 1991–
2006 
Industry  1991–1995  1996–2000  2001–2006 
Mining and petroleum  1.4%  48.4%  33.2% 
Food, beverages and tobacco  24.8%  0.5%  0.5% 
Metals  0.0%  0.6%  29.9% 
Electricity, gas and water  0.0%  7.8%  1.8% 
Transport and telecom  0.0%  23.6%  15.5% 
Finance  0.0%  0.5%  13.8% 
Source: UNCTAD, Cross-border M&A database     
 
On  the  countries  of  origin,  and their  his torical  shift, it is  possible  to 
observe a variety of situations in different groups of transition economies (figure 
7). The only real common thread is the importance of “old” new EU members as 
sources of FDI for all of them, and the relatively stable, but clearly lower share 
of the United States: 
  In the new EU, other EU members dominated largely (especially 
France, Austria and Germany), followed by other developed countries (United 
States). The share of some of the source countries was rising between periods, 
while that of others was declining. For example, the share of Germany and of the 
Netherlands declined significantly from their initially high levels. The share of 
the  United  States  was  relatively  stable,  while  fluctuations  (up  and  down) 
characterized the share of France. Of the rising sources, the United Kingdom and 
Poland are notable ones, as well as Austria, whose share was increasing very 
quickly. If the aim of this geographical exercise is to identify non-traditional 
sources of FDI, the case of Poland has to be mentioned. In addition, Austria can 
be considered as a border case between traditional and non-traditional sources of 
FDI. 
  In South-East Europe, sources of cross-border M&A investment are 
more  evenly  spread;  still  “other  EU”  (Germany,  Italy)  and  other  developed 
countries (United States) dominate. Over time, the share of Germany and Italy 
rose and declined, while that of the United States declined and rose. In the new 
millennium,  Norway,  Hungary  (two  non-traditional  sources),  and  France 
emerged as major investors. 
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Figure 7. Geographical composition of cross-border M&A sales in 
economies in transition, 1991–2006 (Per cent) 
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  In the Russian Federation, pre-2004 EU member countries are again 
the  main  source  of  cross-border  M&A  investment  (especially  the  United 
Kingdom and Germany), but developing countries are second (especially China 
and  India),  and  other  developed  countries  third  (United  States).  The  most 
important historical changes were the rise of resource-seeking China, the decline 
and  recovery  of  resource-seeking  India,  the  rise  and  decline  of  the  round-
tripping hub Cyprus, and the rise and decline of the United Kingdom, related to 
the investment of BP into its BP-TNK joint venture in the late 1990s. 
  In other CIS countries, the “old” EU was still important (especially 
the Netherlands, which alone represented 32% of the total), but economies in PATTERNS OF INWARD FDI IN ECONOMIES IN TRANSITION    69 
 
transition (the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan) were on the second place. 
The  Netherlands  and  the  Russian  Federation  rose  over  time.  For  the  latter, 
geographical and cultural proximity explains the success of investments. Natural 
resource seeking M&As from China and Japan grew, especially from the latter. 
Further research should establish why Kazakhstan is so prominent on the top list. 
To sum up, “other EU” dominate in all subregions, and new sources of cross-
border M&As exist but play a more moderate role. These latter are often natural 
resource seeking; this is why they are particularly important sources of cross-
border M&As in the Russian Federation, and partly in other CIS countries. 
 
5. The case of the pre-crisis automotive industry 
Of the industries brought in or strengthened by inward FDI, electronics 
and automotive are particularly important from the point of view of enhancing 
competitiveness and structural upgrading (UNCTAD, 2002; Szanyi, 2006), as 
well  as  technological  progress  (Pavl￭nek,  2002).  They  differ  however  in  the 
sense that FDI in electronics enhances technological upgrading but a weaker 
contribution to local supplier links, while the reverse is true to the automotive 
industry. For economies in transition, as they need to strengthen their domestic 
enterprises  parallel  with  their  opening  to  international  transactions,  the 
automotive industry is one of the main channels of potential linkages with local 
suppliers, although often at the level of second-tier suppliers only in the initial 
phase  of  new  projects  (Ferenč￭kov￡  and  Fifekov￡,  2006).  Additionally,  the 
automotive  industry  has  a  strong  clustering  effect  on  the  host  economy 
(Radosevic and Rozeik, 2005). 
In economies in transition, practically all projects were related to FDI, as 
national champions characterizing the development of Japan and the Republic of 
Korea  in  this  domain  are  mostly  missing.
7  At the early stages of transition, 
countries with capacities inherited from communist times, such as the Czech 
Republic and Poland, opted for the privatization of existing factories, while in 
countries where these capacities were lacking at the outse t, greenfield projects 
dominated FDI in automotive from the outset (table 5). However, as time passed 
by, greenfield investment became the main form of FDI. It is important to note 
that in the longer run, differences between modes of entry (privatization v ersus 
greenfield projects) have mattered little, as privatization projects in most cases 
have  in fact  been „brownfield‟  projects, in  which  the  initial  sales  have  been 
followed by new investments by the new owners (Meyer and Estrin, 2001). In 
both cases, foreign owners were quick in introducing improved management and 
organizational practices (Pavl￭nek, 2002). The main differences between the two 
                                                           
7 There were attempts at the beginning of transition to keep national champions in the Russian 
Federation  (Pavl￭nek,  2002).  Later  on,  however,  Russian  firms  too  opted  for  joint  venture 
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modes of entry lie in the level of local value added after the entry of foreign 
investors, which tended to be high in privatized plants and low in greenfield 
projects, with a tendency of convergence at later stages. It is also notable that 
local embeddedness has depended much on the technological sophistication of 
the assembly factories: high-technology projects such as Audi (Hungary) have 
had much more limited local sourcing than lower-technology projects such as 
Suzuki (Hungary) (UNCTAD, 2002).  
 
Table 5. Economies in transition are host to large car assembly projects: 
examples, 2007 
Country  Location  Producer  Established  Form of entry 
Czech Republic  Mlada 
Boleslav 
Volkswagen/ 
Skoda 
1991  Privatization 
  Kolin  Toyota/PSA   2002  Greenfield 
  Novosice  Hyundai  2006  Greenfield 
Hungary  Esztergom  Suzuki  1991  Greenfield 
  Gy￶r  Audi  1992  Greenfield 
Poland  Bielso Biala  Fiat  1991  Privatization 
  Poznan  Volkswagen  1993  Greenfield 
  Warsaw  Daewoo FSO  1996  Privatization 
  Gliwice  General 
Motors/Opel 
1998  Greenfield 
Romania  Pitesti  Renault Dacia  1995  Privatization 
Russian Federation  Togliatti  GM/AvtoVAZ 
joint venture 
2002  Privatization 
  Vzhevolovsk  Ford  2002  Greenfield 
  Moscow  Renault  2005  Privatization 
Slovakia  Bratislava  Volkswagen  1993  Privatization 
  Trnava  PSA/Peugeot  2003  Greenfield 
  Zilina  Hyundai/KIA  2004  Greenfield 
Slovenia  Novo Mesto  Renault  1991  Privatization 
Source: UNCTAD         
 
FDI in automotive assembly accentuates or exacerbates the differentiation 
between  countries,  especially  the  haves:  Czech  Republic,  Hungary,  Poland, 
Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia etc., and the have nots: large parts of the 
CIS (table 5). Future or ongoing large projects such as Mercedes‟ A car project 
in  Hungary  (IHT,  2008),  or  the  series  of  new  car  projects  in  the  Russian 
Federation in 2008 (UNCTAD, 2008a), still tend to target the same „haves‟, 
further  increasing  the  differences  between  the  haves,  where  car  assembly  is 
growing fast as a result of successful projects (table 6), and the have nots, where 
production is still zero. In the former group, policy makers can afford choosing 
between future industrial development strategies based on quick technological 
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combined with a faster increase of local linkages and local jobs. In both cases, 
they can measure their development gains. In the have not group, policy makers 
face tougher choices: they have to raise the question to what degree it is realistic 
to  expect the  automotive industry  arrive  to  them,  or  they  need  to  base their 
catching up with the rest of the region on other industries. In the former case, 
they have to increase efforts to attract such projects; in the latter case, however, 
economic policies should find other priority industries. 
 
Table 6. Production of passenger cars in selected countries, 2005–2007 
(Number of units) 
Country  2005  2006  2007  Change 2007/2005 (%) 
Czech Republic  596 774  848 799  925 778  55.1 
Poland  540 100  632 300  695 000  28.7 
Slovakia  218 349  295 391  571 071  161.5 
Hungary  148 553  187 633  287 982  93.9 
Romania  174 538  201 663  234 103  34.1 
Slovenia  138 393  119 212  174 209  25.9 
Source: European Automobile Manufacturers‟ Association 
 
6. Remarks about the crisis 
The crisis of 2008–2009 has highlighted one additional problem related to 
the  champion  industries  of  structural  change  (automotive  and  electronics  in 
particular), namely their relative vulnerability to changes in global markets. For 
example,  the  crisis  brought  about  a  need  for  restructuring  in  the  global  car 
industry,  and  it  has  affected  production  sited  in  economies  in  transition, 
independently of their efficiency. It remains to be analysed in the future if these 
development are signs of a shift away of production in those economies, or they 
can regain or even strengthen their competitiveness in the post-crisis era. As will 
be highlighted at the end of this section, the possibility of regained, or even 
strengthened competitiveness, is not excluded. However, it is still too early to 
provide  a  definitive  analysis  of  the  impact  of  the  crisis  on  economies  in 
transition. 
As far as the group of new EU members is concerned, this was the group 
of  transition  economies  that  had  undergone  the  deepest  integration  with  the 
world in its  productive  capacity,  and logically  was the  most affected by  the 
crisis. As the manufacturing export platforms of new EU member countries were 
all dominated by foreign affiliates, or they were the only players (as was the case 
in automotive), the degree of decline could be gauged from general output and 
export statistics. In February 2009, one of the deepest points of the crisis (table 
7): Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary and Latvia, Slovakia and 
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exports (over 20%) and in the exports of the transport equipment industry (over 
40%). 
 
Table  7.  Year-to-year  changes  in  manufacturing  output  and  exports, 
selected countries, February 2009, in percent points 
Country  Change in 
manufacturing output  
Change in 
manufacturing exports 
Change in the exports of 
transport equipment 
Bulgaria  -24.3  -39.2  -41.0
a 
Czech Republic  -23.4  -22.2  ... 
Estonia  -32.7  -26.0  -54.0 
Hungary  -26.1  -30.4  -48.1 
Latvia  -24.3  -29.3  ... 
Lithuania  -17.9  -21.8  -31.9 
Poland  ...  -24.8  -25.7 
Romania  -14.5  -15.9  ... 
Slovakia  -28.2  -31.0  ... 
Slovenia  -24.1  -25.1  -42.3
b 
Source: Kalotay and Filippov, 2009 
a Machinery and transport equipment. 
b January 2009. 
 
This decline is not necessarily the sign of the end of the car manufacturing 
industry  in  economies  in  transition.  It  has  been  shown  that  since  then 
manufacturing  output  and  exports  have  rebounded,  and  sometimes  in  a 
spectacular  manner.  An  even  more  important  question  is  the  capacity  of 
transition economies in attracting FDI projects in the post-crisis phase. As a case 
study to prove that a new round of investment in the automotive industry of the 
region is not excluded, it is possible the refer to Hungary, where one automotive 
project  (that  of  Mercedes  Benz)  was  announced  during  the  crisis  (2008), 
followed in 2010 by announcements by Audi and Opel on major extension plans 
on their existing capacities (Die Presse, 2010).  
 
7. Some policy-oriented conclusions 
It has to be emphasized again that FDI has been one of the main channels 
of reintegrating the economies in transition in the world economy.  Since the 
beginning of transition, various countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the 
CIS have undergone important structural changes, linked with the entry of FDI. 
In the early phases of transition, these structural changes were linked with the 
adjustment  of  enterprises  to  the  requirements  of  the  new,  market-based 
macroeconomic framework. It was followed by a phase of structural changes 
determined by the demand and supply factors of the newly established market 
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in this phase, structural change proceeded unevenly, with future EU members 
advancing faster than other countries in transition (Szanyi, 2004). 
The current stage of FDI and structural change is strongly influenced by the 
relationship of economies in transition with the EU. Those countries that have 
joined the EU have undergone a process of adjustment in the inward FDI to the 
requirements of the economic union (Kalotay, 2006, 2008). Potential candidate 
countries have followed that path, but at a slower speed. As for CIS members, 
the main structural changes in the current phase of FDI flows reflect their status 
of external suppliers of inputs, especially those of raw materials. This process 
was slowed down and disrupted by the crisis of 2008-2009; however with the 
gradual recovery of FDI from 2010 on, the process of spreading FDI can restart. 
In fact it is an open question which economies in transition will benefit more 
from the FDI recovery. 
In economies in transition, FDI has been an agent for structural changes, 
but  rather  unevenly.  It  created  strong  structural  change  only  in  the  new  EU 
member countries. In other economies in transition, not just the volume of FDI 
was more modest, but also its structural impact was less clear. Structural change 
in FDI was less pronounced in South-East Europe and in some CIS countries, 
and FDI contributed to the conservation of dependence on extractive industries 
in the Russian Federation.  On the basis of these findings, one has to ask, if 
policies to attract FDI and benefit from it have been sufficient and the right ones 
from the point of view of desirable structural changes in the recipient economies. 
The uneven record of FDI in structural change raises the question if there is a 
need for a stronger link between investment promotion and industrial policy. 
The relationship between the quantity and the quality of FDI still needs to be 
better understood, especially in order to draw lessons for investment promotion, 
which for the moment is more articulate on quantity than on quality. Moreover, 
the fact that FDI and private ownership are no longer so clearly interrelated, and 
FDI can grow in parallel with more State ownership, raises the question of how 
policies to attract FDI have to be modified in face of the rise of State-owned 
FDI. 
Finally, and probably most importantly, there is an important number of 
economies in transition that are marginalized in FDI flows. In those countries, 
the question of FDI flows and structural change is not yet on the agenda because 
the former are too limited to be expected to have any significant impact, positive 
or negative. The question is how these countries can overcome the three types of 
handicaps they are suffering from. Can they mitigate their geographical handicap 
through  infrastructure  development?  Can  they  mitigate  their  market  size 
handicap via specific economic development strategies? Can they mitigate their 
policy handicap through an improvement of FDI policies? 
All these questions now have to be raised in the context of a potentially 
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2008b). It is known from the experience of past financial crises that FDI is more 
resistant to the downturn than international portfolio flows and bank loans. They 
however affect the willingness and the capabilities of TNCs to invest abroad. It 
is also a question to what degree the contagion of crisis spreads to economies in 
transition as host countries of FDI. While some of them with relatively isolated 
economies  can  withstand  the  crisis  well,  smaller  economies  with  deep 
integration into the world economy may be vulnerable to a prolonged downturn. 
And in the case of economies with a history of capital flight such as the Russian 
Federation (Bulatov, 1998), a lack of confidence may result to a resurrection of 
capital flight (New York Times, 2008), affecting mostly portfolio investments, 
but potentially spreading to FDI too. Under such a scenario of slowdown in FDI, 
the  potential  for  structural  change  carried  out  through  that  channel  can  also 
suffer.  
The FDI downturn has created a major policy challenge for governments 
worldwide  and  economies  in  transition  in  particular.  The  crisis  has  further 
highlighted the need for policies aimed at upgrading production capacities to 
higher value-added activities, especially in the form of investment in knowledge 
and innovation, and support to R&D function of foreign affiliates. This makes 
the need for strong and proactive FDI policies even more evident. 
The  above  questions  on  FDI  and  structural  change  in  economies  in 
transition require further analysis, including more quantitative and econometric 
studies. These future studies could shed also further light on additional country-
by-country and period-by-period difference that this summary study could not 
highlight. 
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